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ABSTRACT
Resilience Modeling of Surface Transportation System in Mixed Traffic Environment
Shofiq Ahmed

Large-scale natural disasters challenge the resilience of surface transportation system. The
objective of this research was to develop a resilience model of surface transportation system in
mixed-traffic environment considering varying Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV)
penetration scenarios. As deployment of CAVs are expected to improve traffic operations, a
resilience model was developed in this research to evaluate the resilience performance of a
transportation system with several CAV penetration levels (0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%) for a
given budget and recovery time. The proposed resilience quantification model was applied on a
roadway network considering several disaster scenarios. The network capacity in terms of trips at
any phase of disaster was compared to the pre-disaster trips to determine the system resilience.
The capacity variation and the travel time variation was also estimated. The analysis showed that
the resilience phenomenon of the transportation system improved with CAVs in respect of travel
time and capacity improvement. The rate of improvement in link travel time for varied CAV
penetration was almost identical for different disaster scenarios. For each disaster scenario, the
individual link travel time reduced significantly with increased CAV penetration. However, higher
penetration of CAVs (i.e., 50% or more), increased the recovery budget requirement. For example,
the recovery budget needed for medium and large-scale disasters were 50% and 90% higher
respectively compared to the recovery budget needed for a small-scale disaster. These higher costs
were primarily needed for repair and replacement of intelligent infrastructure required for CAV.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
The transportation system is designed to operate under normal weather conditions with limited
consideration of extreme weather hazards. Thus, severe weather events such as large snowfall,
heavy rainfall, hurricane, tornado, or even manmade disasters may cause significant degradation
of the system performance. As the transportation system is one of the largest critical infrastructure
systems, disruption may cause significant economic, social and financial impacts to the affected
region. For example, in 2017, major 16 natural disaster events caused approximately $312.7 billion
worth of damage collectively to the transportation and infrastructure systems in the United States,
and caused 362 fatalities [1]. Due to higher frequency of natural disasters in recent years, the
consequences of disasters on transportation systems has received increasing attention from policy
makers and researchers. Transportation system’s performance is critical to disaster response such
as evacuation operation before disasters, rescue operations, and recovery activities during and after
disasters. Resilience of a transportation system defines the inherent quality of the system to recover
from unwanted consequences. To address this need, researchers have formulated resilience
quantification models and strategical mitigation approaches to estimate the resilience of a
transportation system to improve system resilience and reduce impact and duration of disaster
recovery time (for a comprehensive discussion see [2]). Though impact of different types of
disaster events were considered in past studies to estimate the transportation system resiliency, the
impacts of intelligent transportation system (ITS) were investigated in very limited scale. As
sensors, computing platforms and communication networks play an important role in ITS
functionalities of modern ground transportation system [3], cybersecurity and failure risk of
backbone infrastructure has become a critical issue [4, 5, 6]. The security implications of
compromising a car’s internal communication network can lead to crash [5]. Furthermore, as
observed in the past, hacking of the roadside signs or ITS components such as variable message
signs (VMS) can lead to unwanted consequences (e.g., congestion or inappropriate
message/misinformation display) [4]. Similarly, security of future vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication systems of CAV can be common cyber security
target and must be secured to eliminate all potential cyber-attacks [5, 7]. However, recent trends
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in the impact of flooding caused by the severe hurricane or other natural disaster scenarios has
been the prime concern of this research work. Therefore, this work has considered the impact of
natural disaster scenario such as hurricane, flooding etc. in their model development in which roads
and infrastructural elements (i.e. road side unit) become dysfunctional or damaged.
Deployment of ITS features (such as connected and automated vehicles, intelligent signal
systems, and adaptive safety solution) in traditional transportation systems can alter the resilience
phenomenon and system performance metrics. In recent years, significant advances were made in
connected and automated vehicle (CAV) technologies, with expected deployment within the next
decade. It is important for transportation professionals to study these new technologies to
understand both potential benefits and negative consequences. In general, CAVs rely on their V2V
and V2I communication, and a diverse array of sensors for driverless navigation on roadways. The
first generation of CAVs will interact with other CAVs and non-CAVs, herein considered a mixedtraffic environment. As CAV operational efficiency depends on ITS infrastructure, such as road
side V2I communication infrastructure, transportation agencies need to install and maintain these
devices to support CAVs. Researchers have quantified the resilience of the conventional
transportation system (i.e., system with non-CAV only) in many literatures (for example, [8, 9]).
Further, several recent studies have analyzed the performance of CAV operation in a natural
disaster scenario, and in a mixed-traffic environment (e.g., [10, 11]). However, no study
investigated the implication of CAV in quantifying transportation system resilience considering
travel time and capacity implications and network resilience performance. This study developed a
resilience estimation framework that can be used to analyze resilience of surface transportation
system in a mixed-traffic environment considering different disaster scenarios and CAV
penetration levels. In general, the natural disaster impacts on the transportation system include the
closure of the lane(s) or roadway segments due to flooded conditions, pavement damage, broken
or dysfunctional signal systems and other CAV road side units, and lead to capacity and flow
reduction.

1.2 Objectives of the study
The primary objective of this study was to develop a new resilience model to analyze the
transportation system, considering a mixed-traffic environment including both CAVs and non-
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CAVs to assess and quantify the transportation system’s performance metrics and resilience. The
model was formulated as a combination of transportation system performance matrices. Along
with the resilience characteristics, the critical role of recovery budget and recovery time on postdisaster transportation system performance was also evaluated in a mixed-traffic environment.
The specific objectives of the study were as follows:


Investigate the criticality of network nodes due to the variation of the disaster impact,



Investigate the variation in link travel time for different penetration of CAV environment
due to the influence of the different disaster scenarios,



Estimate the resilience of the transportation network system due to different disaster impact
scenarios, and



Evaluate the impact of recovery budget and time on post disaster transportation system
performance.

1.3 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is composed of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction on importance of
transportation system resilience and motivation of the research and presents the research
objectives. Chapter 2 reviews past research on resilience in the transportation domain and the
impacts of ITS and CAV technologies on the transportation system’s resilience. Chapter 3
describes the components of the proposed resilience model and the mathematical formulation of
transportation system resilience in a mixed-traffic environment (i.e., CAV and non-CAV). Chapter
4 presents the hypothetical disaster scenarios and the studied transportation network system.
Chapter 5 describes the application of the proposed resilience models on the hypothetical
transportation network and reports the results. Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions and identifies
future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Implementation of connected and automated vehicle (CAV) in the transportation system will affect
the resilience performance metrics of the transportation network. Based on the literatures, CAV
deployment, in general, will increase the capacity of signalized intersections [12, 13], improve
weather condition data collection and prediction [14], change driving behavior such as reduced
headway [15, 16], improve adaptive cruise control performance [17, 18], improve advanced
traveler information systems [19, 20], and improve traffic management system performance [21].
Many studies on resilience relied on the stepwise activity-based resilience model
development considering network travel time, demand and capacity in the context of disasters [8,
22]. For example, the Networked Infrastructure Resiliency Assessment (NIRA) framework can be
used to analyze resiliency of any network based infrastructure system such as a transportation
system, energy system, or communication system [22]. Resilience was quantified and formulated
in the work as an optimization problem to minimize the average travel time between the origin and
destination [22]. Faturechi and Miller-Hooks formulated a nonlinear, stochastic and bi-level model
for Travel Time Resilience Problem (TTRP). Origin-Destination (O-D) trips travel time were
considered as the resilience parameter. Within this bi-level model, the expected value of network
system resilience was maximized in the upper level for all given scenarios, and the flow pattern
was optimized in the lower level to determine the link flows considering a partial user equilibrium
[8].
Other studies proposed an optimization-based resilience model to quantify transportation
system resilience [9, 23, 24]. Considering budget, time, and resource constraints, Chen and MillerHooks formulated a stochastic mathematical program to quantify resilience level through
maximization of travel demand that could be satisfied in post disaster scenario [9]. Although [8]
discussed resilience in a simple hypothetical road network system, [9] considered an inter-modal
freight system of the western United States (US) in their model performance evaluation. The
resilience model analyzed several natural and man-made disaster scenarios (e.g., bombing, terrorist
attack, flood, earthquake) and showed that the resilience level could be improved by 57%, on
average, due to the level of recovery effort [9]. As an extension of this study, Miller-Hooks et al.
formulated the resilience parameter as the maximum post-disaster flow of shipments in the
network for disruption scenario and developed the resilience model to measure and maximize the
4

resilience of freight transportation networks [23]. In addition to travel time as the key resilience
measure, Donovan and Work considered travel time per mile (i.e., pace) variation to assess the
resilience of transportation network [24]. This study used GPS datasets from taxi trips in the New
York City, NY and showed that Hurricane Sandy and Hurricane Irene increased per mile travel
time by two minutes and 40 seconds respectively [24].
Beyond estimating resilience of a system, some studies evaluated the impact of the
investment decisions on infrastructure and proposed resilient investment model to improve the
performance of networked infrastructure from disruptions. For example, [25, 26] proposed a
system performance evaluation model considering the impact of investment decisions to protect
and improve the transportation infrastructure performance from future natural disaster events. The
impacts of probable flood scenarios based on the prediction of sea level rise (SLR) datasets on
Washington, DC transportation system were considered. [26] showed the impacts of protective
infrastructure (e.g., flood barrier/dam, elevating streets or rails, increasing pumping capacity of
tunnels) in reducing recovery cost. It was estimated that by implementing chosen protective
infrastructure investment for forecasted future climatic events, recovery cost can be reduced by
54% [26]. Asadabadi and Miller-Hooks studied the maritime transport resilience and optimized a
cooperative and competitive investment program among ports within a maritime transportation
network to improve the port throughput performance in disaster scenarios [27].
Several post-disaster survey-based studies designed real world implications of different pre
and post disaster activities that might be crucial in disaster scenarios to measure the transportation
system performance. For instance, Kontou et al. conducted a survey to identify commuters’ trip
making behavior to measure the transportation performance disruption after Hurricane Sandy [28].
According to [28], parents with highr number of children got back to normal working schedule
where household with higher income relied on telecommuting longer in post-disaster situation.
Freckleton et al. proposed a resilience model to estimate transportation network performance [29].
Sixteen variables were used including transportation system parameter (such as level of service,
travel time, or mode of transport) and disaster response (such as resource availability, emergency
response) to determine the ultimate network resiliency. Each parameter was assigned a quantitative
or qualitative measure and based on the combination, the resilience of the network was estimated
as low, moderate, high or very high [29].
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Other than road-based network system, several studies evaluated the resilience of air
transportation system. For example, [30, 31] proposed an airline flow-based resilience model
considering the number of arrival and departure flows on an air-hub (airport) to quantify the air
transportation network system resilience. While Janić measured resilience for an air transport
network (consisting of multiple airports) [30], Faturechi et al. presented resilience model to
measure resilience for the pavement network of an airport [31].
As CAV deployment is expected to impact the transportation system performance, several
studies have considered a mixed-traffic environment with different penetration rates of CAVs, and
estimated the level of service (LOS) [10, 32, 33]. Several studies investigated the impacts of CAVs
during natural disasters such as flood or earthquake [11, 34]. Zhu and Ukkusuri proposed a car
following model parameter estimation model in a no-disaster mixed-traffic (i.e., connected and
non-connected vehicles) environment and measured the travel time and travelled distance using
connected vehicle data [10]. Another study proposed a framework using connected vehicle (CV)
technology to optimally route the vehicles in a flooding scenario applying the time-dependent
hyper-star algorithm [11]. Researchers also showed that a higher penetration of CVs and longer
evacuation time improves the evacuation operation in a CV environment [34].
Few research articles and reports were also explored to review the infrastructure
requirement of CAVs and to understand better the implications of CAV in transportation system
performance during disaster scenarios. For instance, [35] discussed, in general, policy related facts
(i.e. road signage and markings requirement) for the implementation of CAV. [36] developed the
optimal strategy to allocate the emergency resource including fire safety team and equipment, and
ambulances to maximize the service oriented coverage to the critical transportation infrastructures.
Further, [37, 38] designed the impacts of pre-positioning of emergency supplies and protective
resources to reduce the disaster consequences.
Time step conceptual failure analysis model [39] was evaluated in this study to generate
the relative impact of failed components within the network system. [40] evaluated the lane
merging implication for mixed-traffic scenario and provided a general headway scenario for traffic
stream which was adopted in this study to calculate the average headway of mixed-traffic. [41, 42]
discussed the factors that can influence the capacity of a road link most and recommended that
number of lanes and lane widths were the most influential factors. For a comprehensive review on
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resilience parameters, [44] was reviewed and to develop comprehensive disaster scenarios, this
study relied on few national research reports on the real disaster impact (for example, [45, 46]).
Finally, to analyze the model implication on a case study or network system, this study considered
the Nguyen-Dupuis network system and it’s characteristics from [47]. [47] modeled the optimal
plate scanning location for various origin-destination demand scenarios.
Though there were numerous research publications on resilience quantification of surface
transportation system considering conventional traffic (i.e., non-CAV), no study attempted to
study the resilience of a transportation system holistically in a mixed-traffic environment. A new
resilience model was proposed to quantify the transportation system resilience performance
metrics in the mixed-traffic environment in this study.
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD
Different sensors, V2V and V2I communication system of CAVs will alter key traffic parameters
and patterns that are related to the performance of a transportation network. Key parameters and
patterns include travel demand (e.g., population with disability can make trips with CAV), level
of service (LOS) improvement due to increased roadway capacity, condition of road links, and
travel time reduction due to real time shortest route selection. In general, due to the disaster impact:
(i) some trips can get cancelled due to the failed nodes/links along the route; (ii) some trips cannot
occur due to unavailability of routes; and (iii) many trips will take longer travel time due to the
disaster impact.
While several researches considered travel time parameter to estimate transportation
system resilience through measuring travel time changes due to the disaster [8, 24], others
expressed resilience as the trip handling capacity of the network in post-disaster scenario compared
to pre-disaster scenario [9, 23, 30, 31]. As road link capacity improvement, travel time reduction,
efficient and safe driving are expected to be key improvements CAV brings to the transportation
system, in this study, the transportation system resilience was estimated based on the traffic flow
variation, travel time variation, and capacity variation in a mixed-traffic environment. The
proposed resilience model considered these potential improvements in the evaluation of
transportation system resilience. Furthermore, CAV systems are expected to rely on detailed
mapping of the road network including infrastructural components such as road side units (RSUs),
advanced signal operation system, digital road markings and signage [35]. The rapid repairs of
affected transportation network in the disaster recovery stage is critical to support CAVs
operations. To account for these repairs, a Disruption Impact Factor (DIF) was introduced in this
work. This factor expressed the criticality of nodes (i.e., intersections) in terms of disaster impact
and can be used to prioritize most critical nodes for repair within the given budget. Several past
research articles divided disaster durations in three stages [8, 31]. However, in these three-stage
classification, there is no defined stage which investigates the system’s network condition during
disaster landfall and after the recovery activities. To consider these two distinct disaster phases,
the disaster timeline is divided into five disaster phases in this model to analyze the performance
of transportation system in smaller timescales. These five phases included a preparation phase,
immediately before disaster impact phase, a disaster impact phase, immediately after disaster
8

impact phase, and a recovery phase. The formulation of performance metrics and the detailed
explanation of the five phases are discussed in the following subsections.

3.1 Preparation Phase (Phase 1, P1)
Numerous works studied network fortification by pre-planned resource allocation and reinforcing
network components in the disaster preparation phase [for example, 23, 36, 37]. In this work,
preparation phase does not necessarily mean that there is a forecasted disaster or that preparedness
activities need to be undertaken. Rather, this phase represents the importance of understanding the
pre-disaster normal traffic condition of the transportation network system and its performance
level in terms of resilience parameter so that if any disaster happens the impact of disaster on
system performance can be estimated and quantified. Though the preparedness activity such as:
development of evacuation plan and training teams for rapid recovery [31], development of
effective disaster management technique through pre-planned resource allocation [38], high
resolution forecasting of the disaster to estimate the disaster impact [25, 26] are critical
components in the preparation phase before any disaster happening, this study has not investigated
the implication of evacuation strategy. Rather, only the estimation of the resilience parameters is
considered in preparation phase in mixed traffic environment. In this section, the parameters that
influence the performance of the system and will be impacted by the CAV presence in before,
during, after disaster scenarios are expressed to represent these impacts. The formulation of the
performance metrics is elaborately discussed in the following sub-sections.

3.1.1 Disaster Impact Factor (DIF)
Because the propagation of disruption or disaster in the transport network over time is a critical
factor in resilience analysis (i.e., the relative temporal impact of the disaster in different nodes),
the researchers defined a disruption impact factor (DIF) based on the time step conceptual failure
analysis proposed in [39]. The time step technique through failure analysis in [39] showed that
failure of a single node can trigger the failure of a system of nodes and the failure pattern will be
propagated in several time steps based on the connection pattern between nodes. For example,
consider that during time step t0, node a0 is impacted. If a0 is connected to a1 and a2, then in time
step t1, nodes a1 and a2 could be impacted. Consequently, in time step t2, the nodes connected to a1
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and a2 could be impacted. Considering this failure pattern, a DIF was calculated. However, the
consideration that the nodes connected with the impacted node are going to be impacted at the
same time is not reasonably realistic. The time duration to propagate the impact to other nodes
could depend on several factors such as; traffic flow, average velocity, length of the link between
the nodes. Equation 1 shows the formulation of DIF of node. DIF explains the geometric pattern
of the transport network and the inherent quality of the network to survive the disruption (based
on the connection pattern of nodes and which node has been affected first by the disruption). Any
node can be impacted either directly by the disaster or due to the influence of the impacted
neighbor nodes. DIF of a node was formulated considering the influence of the connected links of
that node. The least time duration to get impacted for any node depends on the length of the
neighborhood links, average link speed, and traffic flow on connected links. Therefore, DIF of a
node was formulated as a combination of length, average speed, flow of the connected links by
assigning relative weight to each parameter.

DIF of node, 𝑑𝑖 =

𝛼×𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐿𝑖𝑗 )
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐿𝑙 )

𝑡

𝑡

+

𝛽×𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑖 )
𝑡

𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑣𝑙 𝑖 )

+

𝛾×𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑖 )
𝑡

𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓𝑙 𝑖 )

………………………………

(1)

Where,
𝑗 = Neighborhood nodes
𝐿𝑖𝑗 = Length of link from node i to j
𝐿𝑙 = Length of link l
𝑡

𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑖 = Average velocity on the link from node i to j during time 𝑡𝑖
𝑡

𝑣𝑙 𝑖 = Average velocity on link l during time 𝑡𝑖
𝑡

𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑖 = Flow on the link from node i to j during time 𝑡𝑖
𝑡

𝑓𝑙 𝑖 = Flow on link l during time 𝑡𝑖
𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 = the relative weights of the three parameters. Each parameter could range from 0 to
1, where higher is more important and where, 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 = 1. Based on the variation of relative
weight, the DIF values for a node can change, which implies that the criticality of nodes in terms
of the disaster impact can vary depending on the relative weight of the considered parameters.
Deciding on which value should be used for 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 is critical. Different traffic agencies may
10

take different initiative to prioritize among these three factors based on their geographical pattern
of the road network, commuters’ trip making behavior, and traffic demand. In general, traffic flow
is considered to be the most important and influential parameter in evaluating the system
performance.

3.1.2 Capacity Estimation of Links
Reduction of average headway in a mixed traffic compared to non-CAV condition increases the
roadway capacity. To estimate the capacity improvement, with the varying penetration rate of
CAV, the saturation headway of mixed traffic was measured using the following equation 2
collected from [40],
Headway of mixed-traffic, ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑥 (𝑃) = 𝑃2 ℎ𝐴𝐴 + 𝑃(1 − 𝑃)(ℎ𝐴𝑀 + ℎ𝑀𝐴 ) + (1 − 𝑃)2 ℎ𝑀𝑀

(2)

Where,
𝑃 = CAV penetration rate
ℎ𝐴𝐴 = Average headway for a CAV following a CAV
ℎ𝐴𝑀 = Average headway for a CAV following a non-CAV vehicle
ℎ𝑀𝐴 = Average headway for a non-CAV following a CAV vehicle
ℎ𝑀𝑀 = Average headway for a non-CAV vehicle following a non-CAV vehicle
According to [40], CAV can follow three headway scenarios; neutral, conservative, and
aggressive. The researchers in this study considered the gradual change in headway preference
from conservative to aggressive depending on the CAV penetration rate following the
recommendation of study [40]: 0-25% CAV penetration will follow ℎ𝐴𝐴 =0.45 secs, ℎ𝐴𝑀 = ℎ𝑀𝐴 =
ℎ𝑀𝑀 =1.8 secs; 26-50% CAV penetration will follow ℎ𝐴𝐴 =0.40 secs, ℎ𝐴𝑀 =1.6, ℎ𝑀𝐴 = ℎ𝑀𝑀 =1.8
secs; 51-75% CAV penetration will follow ℎ𝐴𝐴 =0.35 secs, ℎ𝐴𝑀 =1.4, ℎ𝑀𝐴 = ℎ𝑀𝑀 =1.8 secs; and
76-100% CAV penetration will follow ℎ𝐴𝐴 =0.30 secs, ℎ𝐴𝑀 =1.2, ℎ𝑀𝐴 = ℎ𝑀𝑀 =1.8 secs.
The capacity of link l depends mostly on the number of lanes and lane width [41, 42].
According to [42], lane width has a linear relationship with capacity. As during any disaster
scenario, the operation on any lane can be disrupted, number of functional lanes becomes critical
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in estimating capacity. The capacity of link l in this work was measured as of the following
equation 3, 4, and 5. Standard lane width was assumed to be 12 ft.
𝑡𝑖

𝑡

6

Capacity of link l, 𝐶𝑙 𝑖 = 𝑁𝑙𝑛,𝑙 × 𝐶𝑙𝑛,𝑙 = 𝑁𝑙𝑛,𝑙 × 𝛿𝑙𝑛 × (1 − 100 × 𝑁ln,l ) × 𝑓𝑙𝑛−𝑤 × 𝐶𝑙𝑛 ….

(3)

Where,
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ

Capacity adjustment factor for lane width, 𝑓𝑙𝑛−𝑤 = 1 − 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ ……………
3600

Average capacity per lane, 𝐶𝑙𝑛 = ℎ

𝑚𝑖𝑥

…………………………………………………...

(4)
(5)

𝑡𝑖

𝐶𝑙𝑛,𝑙 = Average capacity per lane in link l during time 𝑡𝑖
𝑁ln,l = Number of lanes in link, l
𝛿𝑙𝑛 = A binary factor to represent lane’s functionality, if a lane is operational then 𝛿𝑙𝑛 = 1,
otherwise 0.

3.1.3 Estimation of Link Flow
Traffic flow on a lane or link can be expressed by equation 6 and 7. Traffic flow shows significant
temporal distribution in different scenario (i.e., disaster impact level) and traffic condition (e.g.,
congestion). For example, traditionally traffic flow is significantly less during midnight compared
to morning peak and evening peak [43]. Furthermore, during the event of any forecasted disaster,
the temporal variation of flow could be significantly different from the traditional situation. In this
research, largest peak flow (between AM peak and PM peak) was considered as peak flow of lane
ln in link l during time 𝑡𝑖 and flow in any link l was expressed as the summation of the flow of
lanes (equation 7). During or after disaster, traffic flow pattern of the network system can radically
change due to the damage to lanes or in some instances, the whole link can be dysfunctional
causing the deviation of routes for certain O-D pairs.
𝑡

𝑡

𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑖
𝑖
Flow of lane ln in link l during time 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑓𝑙𝑛,𝑙
= 𝛿𝑙𝑛 × 𝑝𝑙𝑛,𝑙
× 𝑓𝑙𝑛,𝑙
………………….
𝑡

𝑡

𝑖
Flow of link l during time 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑓𝑙 𝑖 = ∑𝑙𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑛,𝑙
……………………………………………
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(6)

(7)

Where,
𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑓𝑙𝑛,𝑙
= Peak flow of lane ln in link l
𝑡

𝑖
𝑝𝑙𝑛,𝑙
= hourly flow rate as a percentage of peak flow

3.1.4 Estimation of Link travel Time
Typically, every trip takes the shortest route between origin-destination (OD) in normal road
weather condition. However, depending on different disaster scenario impacts and traffic condition
(e.g., congestion), trip makers’ route preference changes. Consequently, average travel time of a
trip or link travel time changes with the route preference. Furthermore, due to the impact of the
disaster in mixed-traffic situation, two situations may arise that includes the complete failure of
some nodes and links (either structurally or functionally) which will impact some OD pairs’ route
preferences and trip decision. Capacity reduction of links will result in more congestion or reduced
LOS. Both situations will attribute to increase in link travel time and total trip time. The updated
travel time of trips and links was measured applying equations 8 and 9.
𝑡𝑖

𝑡𝑖

Travel time of a trip, 𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐷,𝑚𝑖𝑥 = 𝛿𝑟 ∑𝑙,𝑟𝑠 𝑇𝑇𝑙,𝑚𝑖𝑥 ………………………………..........

(8)

Where,
𝑡𝑖

Travel time on link l, 𝑇𝑇𝑙,𝑚𝑖𝑥 = (1 +

𝑡

𝑓𝑙 𝑖
𝑡

𝐶𝑙 𝑖

𝑡

) × 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑙 𝑖 …………………………………..

(9)

Here,
𝑡

𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑙 𝑖 = Free flow travel time on link l during time 𝑡𝑖
𝛿𝑟 = A binary factor to represent availability of route, if a route is available for an origindestination combination, then 𝛿𝑟 = 1, otherwise 0.
𝑟𝑠 = Shortest route

3.1.5 Estimation of Resilience Parameter
As resilience is a system characteristic [44], the system resilience (SR) parameter was introduced
and expressed in this research based on the disruption of the network’s OD trip matrix. Since, trip
handling capacity of a network is a good estimator of the network’s performance, this study used
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the reduction in trip handling capacity to quantify system resilience. Hence, SR was considered as
the ratio of the number of trips in any disaster phase that can be accommodated in that phase to
the number of the pre-disaster OD trip matrix in the system and was expressed as of the following
equation 10. Here pre-disaster trips were represented as the total number of trips in peak hour in a
typical demand scenario for the network and expressed as the trip handling capacity of that
network. As trip handling capacity of a network in pre-disaster scenario is the maximum number
of trips that are served by the network, the SR in pre-disaster phase is equal to 1 and SR for any
other phase can be defined asSystem Resilience, 𝑆𝑅 =

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒

…………………………….…

(10)

3.2 Immediate Before Disaster Impact Phase (Phase 2, P2)
In case of any forecasted disaster, the performance of transportation system in the immediate
before disaster impact phase is critical and crucial for evacuation, response planning and resource
allocation. Before the landfall of a forecasted disaster, the weather degrades significantly. For
example, heavy rainfall and excessive wind (before any disaster) can cause significant
performance reduction of transportation system. This excessive weather disruption phase before
any disaster is defined here as the immediate before disaster impact phase. Usually, this phase can
vary from few hours to few days based on the strength and type of the disaster. As during this
phase, the performance of transportation system is critical due to the preparatory activities, the
quantification of performance degradation during the phase is important. With the deployment of
CAV in mixed-traffic scenario, the performance of system can be estimated through real time
information from CAV vehicles. Using the equations from 1 to 10, the performance metrics and
resilience of the system can be estimated in immediate before disaster impact phase.

3.3 Disaster Impact Phase (Phase 3, P3)
Disaster impact phase starts at the onset of the disaster (for example, landfall of the hurricane). It
may extend from few hours to a few days based on the disaster impacted area size and the strength
of the disaster. During this phase, the transportation system performs at its worst level. To represent
this performance, the resilience parameter of the system can go to the lowest value (even as of
zero). The affected zone could be flooded or inoperable for a significant amount of time. Because
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of the limited traffic demand and near-zero performance during this phase, the researchers did not
include this phase in the resilience analysis.

3.4 Immediate After Disaster Impact Phase (Phase 4, P4)
During the immediate after disaster impact phase (P4), the transportation system starts to operate
on a limited scale. This phase ranges from the end of disaster impact phase to the start of the
recovery and retrofitting activities. In this phase, the critical damage information such as number
of dysfunctional links and nodes and partially or completely failure of CAV infrastructures is
detected which are important to determine resource requirements to recover the system’s resiliency
in recovery phase (P5). By using equation 10 in preparation phase and in this phase and taking the
difference of the values of the resilience parameter, the degradation in resilience of the system can
be measured.

3.5 Recovery Phase (Phase 5, P5)
Recovery phase is defined as the completion of the recovery activities. After the recovery activities
are completed, the resilience of the transportation system improves towards the pre-disaster
condition. If the budget, resources, and recovery time are not enough to comprehend the type and
extent of the damage, the system can lack in terms of the performance compared to pre-disaster
scenario. The amount of the resiliency achieved after the recovery phase is critical in preparing for
future disaster scenarios. Unfortunately, recovery efforts are usually constrained by public and
private budgets, 𝐵 and recovery time 𝑇𝑟 . If the system’s damage state cannot be fully repaired
within the budget and recovery time, then the post-disaster performance of the system would be
lower than the pre-disaster. This method measured 𝐵 and 𝑇𝑟 using equations 11 and 12.
𝑡𝑟𝑅 × 𝑛𝑑 = 𝑇𝑟 × 𝑅…………………………………………………………………….

(11)

𝑐𝑟 × 𝑛𝑑 + 𝑐𝑅 × 𝑅 + 𝑐𝐸 × 𝐸 = 𝐵……………………………………………………..

(12)

Where,
𝑡𝑟𝑅 = Unit recovery time (in hours) needed for a repair team to repair a damaged unit
𝑛𝑑 = Number of damaged units that are needed to be repaired
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𝑅 = Number of repair teams needed
𝐸 = Number of equipment (resources) needed
𝑐𝑟 = Unit cost of repairing a damaged unit (in US $)
𝑐𝑅 = Unit cost of assigning a repair team (in US $)
𝑐𝐸 = Unit cost of using an equipment (in US $)
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CHAPTER 4: DISASTER SCENARIO AND NETWORK SYSTEM
4.1 Development of Disaster Scenarios
To consider different scale of disasters, three scenarios (i.e., small-scale, medium-scale, and largescale) were considered in this research in which number of disrupted or failed nodes ranges from
two to six (with an increment of two) from small-scale to large-scale disaster scenario (shown in
Figure 2). The system resilience and other performance metrics were analyzed for P2, P4, and P5
for each disaster scenario. The change in route selection due to the failure of the nodes and links
were considered in the system resilience calculation. Furthermore, as drivers’ behavior change
during abrupt weather situation such as increase in headway, a headway variation due to non-ideal
roadway weather situation due to disaster was assumed in each phase based on the analysis from
[45]. In general, due to the bad weather situation (e.g., heavy rainfall or excessive wind), some
trips got canceled or postponed [46]. To accommodate this estimation, a portion of traffic demand
reduction was assumed in each scenario. According to Hranac et al. [47], during adverse weather
impact, traffic flow can be reduced by 10% to 30%, while capacity can be reduced by 15% to 30%
and speed can be reduced by 3-4 mph. Even, due to small scale pavement damage (partial failure
condition), the congestion may occur on affected links and lead to reduction in traffic flow.
To comprehend all the above-mentioned typical traffic characteristics during disasters, we
assumed (based on the estimation of the analysis of (45, 46, 47)) that traffic average headway
increased by 3% in small scale, by 5 % in medium scale, and by 10% in large scale in P2, while
headway increment was considered as 10%, 15%, and 25% respectively in P4. As in recovery
phase, the abrupt weather situation is considered to be over, it was assumed that traffic will get
back to typical headway scenario in P5 (i.e., recovery phase). In the case of traffic flow, the route
preference and the availability of alternate routes were analyzed considering the impact of the
failed nodes and links. Further a reduction in traffic demand as of, 15% (in small scale disaster),
25% (medium scale disaster), and 35% (large-scale disaster) were considered to comprehend the
travelers’ disinterest to make trips, the congestion, abrupt weather condition, and partial smallscale damage on the links.
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4.2 Transportation Network System
The proposed resilience model was applied to measure the resilience of the Nguyen-Dupuis
network system (Figure 4.1). Traditionally, this hypothetical network was considered as one-way
network system in several transportation research studies. In this research, two-way movement
was considered to reasonably represent a typical transportation network. Three highlighted
corridors were assumed as arterials (Figure 4.1) and other links were assumed as collectors/local
streets to consider a functional variation in the network. A speed limit of 45 mph and two lanes in
each direction was assumed for arterials and 25 mph speed limit and one lane in each direction
was assumed for collectors. O-D nodes are marked in the figure 4.1 with light blue color. Table 1
and 2 represents the network parameters in traditional traffic scenario which were collected and
factorized from [47]. As [47] considered two-way traffic movement in the Nguyen-Dupuis
network system for the analysis, this study adopted this network for the reliability of the network
performance parameter. The resilience analysis was done for 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% CAV
penetration rates. Furthermore, Figure 4.2 - 4.4 shows the damaged nodes and links considered in
different disaster-scenarios in P4.

Figure 4.1: Nguyen-Dupuis Network (adopted from [47])
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Figure 4.2: Damaged nodes and links considered in P4 resilience analysis small-scale disaster
scenario

Figure 4.3: Damaged nodes and links considered in P4 resilience analysis in medium-scale
disaster scenario
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Figure 4.4: Damaged nodes and links considered in P4 resilience analysis in large-scale
disaster scenario
Table 4.1: Given performance parameters for Nguyen Dupuis network for pre-disaster
condition for manual vehicles (adopted from [47])
Link Capacity
#

(v/hr/ln)

Speed

FFTT

Length

Average

Flow

Travel

limit

(min)

(m)

Velocity (mph)

(v/hr/ln)

time

(mph)

(min)

1

2000

25

7

2.92

12.82

1900

13.65

2

2000

25

9

3.75

13.37

1740

16.83

3

1760

45

9

6.75

33.14

630

12.22

4

1760

45

12

9.00

25.97

1290

20.80

5

1760

45

3

2.25

24.44

1480

5.52

6

2000

25

9

3.75

21.83

290

10.31

7

1760

45

5

3.75

24.44

1480

9.20

8

2000

25

13

5.42

22.03

270

14.76

9

1760

45

5

3.75

35.36

480

6.36

10

1760

45

9

6.75

28.70

1000

14.11

20

11

2000

25

9

3.75

15.97

1130

14.09

12

2000

25

10

4.17

16.89

960

14.80

13

1760

45

9

6.75

33.28

620

12.17

14

2000

25

6

2.50

15.48

1230

9.69

15

2000

25

9

3.75

16.08

1110

14.00

16

1760

45

8

6.00

27.50

1120

13.09

17

2000

25

7

2.92

22.03

270

7.95

18

2000

25

14

5.83

12.76

1920

27.44

19

2000

25

11

4.58

19.08

620

14.41

20

2000

25

11

4.58

13.81

1620

19.91

21

1760

45

8

6.00

42.13

120

8.55

22

1760

45

9

6.75

23.43

1620

17.28

23

1760

45

12

9.00

30.58

830

17.66

24

2000

25

9

3.75

20.00

500

11.25

25

2000

25

6

2.50

19.53

560

7.68

26

2000

25

10

4.17

20.00

500

12.50

27

2000

25

9

3.75

13.37

1740

16.83

28

2000

25

9

3.75

24.27

60

9.27

29

2000

25

13

5.42

24.27

60

13.39

30

2000

25

9

3.75

15.20

1290

14.81

31

1760

45

5

3.75

28.09

1060

8.01

32

1760

45

5

3.75

27.50

1120

8.18

33

1760

45

3

2.25

28.09

1060

4.81

34

1760

45

9

6.75

39.88

226

10.16

35

2000

25

7

2.92

23.58

120

7.42

36

2000

25

7

2.92

12.44

2020

14.07

37

2000

25

14

5.83

12.66

1950

27.65

38

2000

25

9

3.75

13.81

1620

16.29
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Table 4.2: Origin-Destination (OD) distribution used in Nguyen Dupuis network
𝒕

OD pair #

Origin (O)

Destination (D)

𝒊
Flow (𝒇𝑶𝑫
)

1

1

2

630

2

1

3

1290

3

1

8

960

4

2

1

630

5

2

4

960

6

2

12

150

7

3

1

1290

8

3

4

330

9

3

12

120

10

4

2

960

11

4

3

330

12

4

8

630

13

8

1

960

14

8

4

630

15

8

12

180

16

12

2

150

17

12

3

120

18

12

8

180
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Disruption Impact Factor (DIF) Variation for Nodes
Based on different weights assigned to components of DIF (i.e., connected links length, speed and
flow characteristics), DIF ranking of a node can vary. Rank 1 (i.e., maximum DIF value) represents
the most critical node in the network whose failure may affect the performance of the network
most. From the analysis, it was evident that depending on the relative importance given on the
three parameters, the criticality (ranking) of nodes could change. The rationale behind this
phenomenon is that some nodes are more flow sensitive (means they serve higher traffic flow) or
some are speed sensitive (i.e., higher speed). As a result, if larger weight is assigned to flow, higher
traffic flow serving nodes become most critical nodes, whereas, if average speed is assigned larger
weight, nodes connected to high speed links become more critical. For example, node 4 was
connected to high speed links. When the average flow parameter was given equal weight or larger
compared to average speed and link length (Combination 1, 2, and 3), the ranking of node 4 was
3. However, when the speed was assigned more weight compared to flow (Combination 4), the
criticality of node 4 increased (from rank 3 to 2). In this work, DIF was calculated based on four
weightage combinations and finally, DIF of nodes was considered based on the average of those
four combinations. DIF rank of nodes for four combinations of 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 and the average of
four combinations is shown in Figure 5.1. It is evident from Figure 5.1 that node 8 is the most
critical nodes as it is connected with neighborhood links that have the shortest link length, higher
link flow, and higher link velocity.
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Figure 5.1: DIF ranking of nodes for different α, β, and γ combinations and average DIF
ranking
5.2 Network Capacity Variation
The variation in terms of the network capacity to serve trips for different OD pairs are analyzed
and shown in Figure 5.2. The analysis showed, the average capacity drop in P2 phase increased by
disaster severity from small-scale to large-scale disaster scenario due to relative severe pre-disaster
road weather conditions that lead to higher headway. In P4 phase the average capacity drop was
increased by 40% (medium-scale) and 72% (large-scale) and in P5 phase the average capacity drop
was increased by 38% (medium-scale) and 62% (large-scale). From these average capacity drops
in P4 and P5, the relative improvement (in terms of capacity gain from node and link repair) for
varied disaster scenarios with same budget and resource can be estimated.
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Small scale disaster

P4
Medium scale disaster

P5
Large scale disaster

Figure 5.2: Average capacity drop in mixed-traffic environment for varied disaster scenarios
5.3 Travel Time Variation
Individual link travel time variation during different disaster phases are shown in Figures 5.3 to
5.9, and summarized in Figure 5.10. The key observation from the analysis are the following:
(i) Individual link travel time variation during different disaster phases followed similar
trend with different CAV penetration rates. However, with the increasing penetration of CAV, the
travel time reduction was greater as large number of CAVs at higher penetration rates allowed
smaller average headways (For example, link# 18 in Figure 5.3-5.7). The results indicated that the
travel time showed statistically significant reduction at 95% confidence with higher penetration of
CAV in any disaster phase.
(ii) Individual link travel time value of 0 (zero) represented the failed links due to disaster
and cannot be accessed during P4 phase until recovery activities restore the capacity of the affected
links.
(iii) Individual link travel time increased for same CAV penetration in P2 phase with the
increased severity of disaster scenario due to relatively severe bad weather condition in immediate
before disaster impact phase (P2) (For example, link# 18 in Figure 5.4, 5.8, 5.9).
(iv) Individual link travel time variation for varied disaster scenarios in P4 and P5 phases
and varied CAV penetration dependents on the total number of failed components including nodes
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and links in each disaster scenario. If this number changes, travel time variation of un-affected or
partially affected links will also change (For example, link# 20 in Figure 5.4, 5.8, 5.9).
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Figure 5.3: Individual link’s travel time variation for 0% CAV penetration due to the impact
of the small-scale disaster scenario
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Figure 5.4: Individual link’s travel time variation for 25% CAV penetration due to the
impact of the small-scale disaster scenario
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Figure 5.5: Individual link’s travel time variation for 50% CAV penetration due to the
impact of the small-scale disaster scenario
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Figure 5.6: Individual link’s travel time variation for 75% CAV penetration due to the
impact of the small-scale disaster scenario
35.00

Travel time (mins)

30.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
1

3

5

7

9

11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37
Link #
P1
P2
P4
P5

Figure 5.7: Individual link’s travel time variation for 100% CAV penetration due to the
impact of the small-scale disaster scenario
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Figure 5.8: Individual link’s travel time variation for medium-scale disaster scenario for
25% CAV penetration
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Figure 5.9: Individual link’s travel time variation for large-scale disaster scenario for 25%
CAV penetration
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Further, in this section, the percentage increment in link travel time in P4 was compared
with link travel time in no-CAV (0%), no-disaster scenario. The maximum, average, and minimum
increment in link travel time due to the impact of small-scale disaster scenario was presented in
the Figure 5.10.

Percentage increment in link Travel Time
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-60%

CAV Penetration
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Figure 5.10: Percentage increase in link travel time in P4 phase in small-scale disaster
scenario with different CAV penetration
In P4 phase, many pre-disaster shortest routes between OD pairs were damaged or became
dysfunctional. Therefore, many trips must rely on limited available routes to complete trips. Due
to this condition, the traffic flow on some links (e.g., link no. 29), increased significantly compared
to the pre-disaster link traffic flow. This travel time analysis was done only for small-scale disaster
scenario. In case of medium-scale and large-scale disasters, the impact of disasters in P4 phase
was so severe that significant number of trips were not possible due to the failure of all available
routes between many OD pairs. The key observations from this analysis are:
(i) On average, link travel time was reduced with higher CAV penetration. Maximum
increment in link travel time in small-scale disaster scenario was observed on link no. 29. Due to
the non-functionality of certain links due to disaster, the traffic flow in this link during P4 was
almost 40 times higher than pre-disaster phase and, and travel time was increased by about 133%.
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However, with higher CAV penetration (i.e., 100% CAV penetration), this travel time increment
can be reduced to 20% from maximum increment of 133%.
(ii) Minimum increment in link travel time was observed on link no. 27 due to 62%
reduction in link traffic flow compared to pre-disaster link traffic flow. This reduction in traffic
flow was due to non-availability of alternate shortest routes that includes this link between certain
OD pairs. With higher CAV penetration this travel time can be reached to 43% (at 100% CAV
penetration) compared to pre-disaster travel time.

5.4 System Resilience (SR) Analysis
As previously mentioned, during the pre-disaster phase, the transportation system resilience was
assumed to be equal to 1. The variation in system resilience due to the impact of the various disaster
scenarios (discussed in Section 4.1) in different disaster phases is shown in Figure 5.15. Some
other key observations from system resilience variation is in the following:

System Resilience (SR)

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

P1
-0.2

P2

P4

P5

Phases of disaster scenario
Small scale disaster

Medium scale disaster

Large scale disaster

Figure 5. 11: Transportation system resilience variation for different disaster scenarios
(i) SR followed a gradual decreasing trend in P2 in all the disaster scenarios compared to
P1. The reduction of SR was 18% in small-scale disaster scenario, suggesting that 18% of the predisaster trips were disrupted due to the disaster impact. The medium and large-scale disaster
scenarios were predicted to have a SR reduction of 29% and 41%, respectively. This trend of SR
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in P2 followed the gradual increase in disaster intensity from small-scale to large-scale disaster
scenario.
(ii) In P4, the total number of disrupted nodes and links was significantly greater in largescale than medium-scale disaster scenario. However, the SR value in both the scenarios was equal
to zero, due to the complete failure (unavailability of routes) of all routes serving OD trips
suggesting that even a comparatively low impact disaster can hamper all the routes for the
hypothetical network used in this study.
(iii) The importance of recovery efforts can be explained through evaluating the SR value
in P5. Here, similar recovery efforts (in terms of recovery time, recovery teams, and equipment)
was considered and the maximum improvement in P5 was compared to P4. The improvement was
found to be 69% for the medium-scale disaster scenario, 29% for the small-scale and 20% for the
large-scale. Further investigation revealed that two of the most critical nodes (according to DIF
ranking) were impacted during the medium- scale disaster scenario. Rapid repair of these two
nodes was possible after the medium-scale disaster, therefore, the medium-scale disaster scenario
showed the most improvement. On the other hand, during the large-scale disaster scenario,
additional two critical nodes (total four nodes) were impacted (making the greatest reduction in
SR in P4), but only two were recovered in P5 due to limited recovery budget.
When the impact of the disaster is large such as in large-scale disaster scenario, the number
of damaged infrastructural components (links and nodes) will be higher. As CAVs significantly
depend on the functional availability of the CAV infrastructural elements (e.g., road side unit for
V2V and V2I communication), to restore the functionality of transportation system at pre-disaster
level, more repair teams and higher repair budget will be required. A comprehensive analysis of
recovery budget and recovery time is explained in the next section.

5.5 Analysis of Recovery Budget and Recovery Time
The impacts of disaster preparedness activities in the pre-disaster phase (Phase 1) was not
considered in the resilience analysis. Well planned pre-disaster management such as resource or
equipment allocation, training of the recovery teams, estimating the impact of the upcoming
disaster can improve the efficiency of the recovery activities. This study assumed equal
preparedness (in terms of budget and resources) for all three disaster scenarios.
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To estimate improvement in the post-disaster performance of the transportation network,
this study analyzed the required recovery budget and recovery time applying equations 11 and 12
in terms of the number of required recovery teams, recovery efforts (in terms of budget, equipment
and recovery manpower) and affected number of nodes and links. Required recovery resources
include recovery time and budget needed to repair all the damaged components in the small-scale
disaster scenario as the base recovery time (𝑇𝑟 ) and base recovery budget (B). With required
small-scale recovery budget and recovery time, approximately 63% link and 85% node
functionality (in terms of number) can be restored in medium-scale disaster scenario, and
approximately 42% link and 69% node functionality can be restored in the large-scale disaster
scenario. Therefore, achieving 100% recovery in the post-disaster phase can be challenging if
recovery time and budget are not adjusted accordingly. For lower penetration of CAVs,
predominant non-CAVs can perform efficiently as these vehicles do not require CAV
infrastructure support. Whereas for higher penetration of CAVs (>50%), additional budget and
resources are needed to repair the required infrastructure within recovery time.
Impact of recovery budget and recovery time were analyzed in this research. Total number
of affected nodes and links were 18, 28, and 36 in the small-scale, medium-scale and large-scale
disaster scenario, respectively. Therefore, with the same number of recovery teams, efforts and
resources, the recovery time will be approximately 50% longer after a medium-scale disaster
scenario and 100% longer in large scale-disaster scenario, compared to the recovery time needed
after a small-scale disaster scenario. This variation in recovery time greatly depends on the affected
or failed nodes and links, and network geometry and size. In terms of recovery budget, the
additional resources compared to small-scale disaster, will be approximately 50% and 90% more,
after a medium and large-scale disaster scenario, respectively. However, in cases of higher
penetration of CAV (e.g., 50% or more), allowing such long recovery time will affect the
operations of CAVs in the post-disaster transportation system. As a result, in cases of high CAV
penetration, the recovery budget can increase significantly (due to assigning more recovery teams,
more equipment, or both) to reduce the recovery time. However, for the road network used in this
research, the recovery budget allowing half recovery time (compared to the time needed for smallscale recovery resources) was estimated to increase additional 10% after the medium and largescale disaster scenarios, respectively. It represents that even a small change in recovery budget can
gain significant improvement in recovery time consideration.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
6.1 Conclusions
The developed resilience model is capable of explaining the change in the resilience performance
of transportation system in mixed-traffic environment. CAVs can assist disaster recovery activities
by providing real time traffic information which can reduce the recovery time and effective
utilization of limited resources. However, careful planning and deployment of CAV-supporting
infrastructure is critical because repair and replacement of CAV infrastructure is expensive and
requires specialized expertise.
This research formulated different resilience performance metrics such as, capacity, flow,
travel time for a mixed-traffic environment. The disruption impact factor (DIF) introduced in this
research is a new way to identify critical nodes in a network considering varying disaster severity,
and associated impacts on the network. During the recovery phase, DIF factor can be used to
identify nodes that need to be repaired first to gain maximum traffic operational efficiency
improvement.
Furthermore, the analysis showed that system resilience (SR) followed a gradual
decreasing trend in P2 in all the disaster scenarios compared to pre-disaster phase (P1) due to
deteriorating roadway weather condition, higher following headway between vehicles, speed drop
(reduction) and roadway capacity reduction. In the case of small-scale disaster scenario, the
reduction of SR was 18% in P2 which mean 18% of the pre-disaster trips were disrupted due to
the pre-disaster condition. Similarly, 29% and 41% trips were disrupted in medium and large-scale
disaster scenario, respectively. The extent of recovery efforts is critical in recovering SR in P5.
With similar recovery efforts in terms of budget and resources, maximum improvement in SR in
P5 (compared to P4) was found for medium-scale disaster scenario (69% resilience gain), while in
small-scale and large-scale disaster scenario this improvement was 29% and 20% respectively.
Though during P4, the SR in medium-scale and large-scale disaster scenarios were same (zero),
resilience gain (repairing equal number of nodes) was disproportionate during P5 with same level
of recovery budget for different severity level of disaster.
Some of the key limitations of this study include that this model does not capable to
consider evacuation strategy in its present form. As evacuation is one of the most common and a
widespread preparatory activity taken in almost all severe disaster scenarios to reduce the disaster
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consequences, this model may be modified in future to accommodate evacuation demand in its
performance analysis. This can be done in Phase 2, as most of the evacuation demand will impact
the performance of transportation network system during that phase. The five phase technique of
classifying disaster impact can come in handy during quantifying resilience of the system in
smaller timescale. In a nutshell, this model is a simplified framework of all the key properties of
the transportation network system for mixed-traffic environment that influence the resilience of
transportation system. This model, in its present form, is applicable to analyze a real world smallsized transportation network system and the impacts of small-medium scale disaster scenarios in
which half portion of the network system may be unaffected. However, this model can further be
modified to perform more robust analysis through involving more contributing parameters.

6.2 Future Research Directions
Several potential future extensions of this work are identified in this sub-section.
1. Evacuation strategy is a key component missing in this model. Further works can be done to
incorporate the evacuation demand and the impact of evacuation in the performance of the
system.
2. The model can be modified to perform more robust analysis considering large-sized network
system and the impact of intense and severe disaster scenario.
3. As in real-world, most transportation networks operate in multimodal environment,
formulating the resilience model considering a multimodal network will be very useful.
4. To include the post-disaster change in travel behavior, the proposed model needs to be revised
to allow route choice modification based on the trip makers’ new route preference.
5. Performance of post disaster transportation system depends on the post disaster regional
activity pattern. Considering this new regional travel pattern in the resilience model will
improve the accuracy of the model.
6. In this research, a hypothetical transportation network was used to evaluate the model
performance. Follow up study using a real-world transportation network can provide more
validity of the proposed model.
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